A machine-assisted view of paraconsistency by Alama, Jesse
ar
X
iv
:1
31
2.
43
81
v1
  [
ma
th.
LO
]  
16
 D
ec
 20
13
A machine-assisted view of paraconsistency
Jesse Alama1
Theory and Logic Group
Technical University of Vienna
alama@logic.at
Abstract
For a newcomer, paraconsistent logics can be difficult to grasp. Even experts in logic
can find the concept of paraconsistency to be suspicious or misguided, if not actually wrong.
The problem is that although they usually have much in common with more familiar logics
(such as intuitionistic or classical logic), paraconsistent logics necessarily disagree in other
parts of the logical terrain which one might have thought were not up for debate. Thus,
one’s logical intuitions may need to be recalibrated to work skillfully with paraconsistency.
To get started, one should clearly appreciate the possibility of paraconsistent logics and
the genuineness of the distinctions to which paraconsistency points. For this purpose,
one typically encounters matrices involving more than two truth values to characterize
suitable consequence relations. In the eyes of a two-valued skeptic, such an approach
might seem dubious. Even a non-skeptic might wonder if there’s another way. To this
end, to explore the basic notions of paraconsistent logic with the assistance of automated
reasoning techniques. Such an approach has merit because by delegating some of the logical
work to a machine, one’s logical “biases” become externalized. The result is a new way to
appreciate that the distinctions to which paraconsistent logic points are indeed genuine.
Our approach can even suggest new questions and problems for the paraconsistent logic
community.
1 Opening non-paraconsistent minds
Given a set X of sentences (formulas, statements, propositions), a notion |= of logical con-
sequence (a relation between subsets of X and X) is said to be explosive if it satisfies the
condition:
{ϕ,¬ϕ } |= ψ for all ϕ and ψ in X
The consequence relation |= is said to be paraconsistent if it is not explosive.
Explosive consequence relations are easily found. The standard consequence relations for
classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and all intermediate logics are explosive. Even “alternative”
logics such as modal logics are explosive. Everyone knows that from explicitly contradictory
information one can infer whatever one wants. Right?
From this perspective, paraconsistency seems impossible, so the claim that it is possible
appears unorthodox, contrarian, or even heretical. It seems that the meaning of certain basic
logical terms such as “negation”, “contradiction”, or “consistency” has to be changed if the
whole approach is to even make sense [8].
This is only the expression of an attitude, or perhaps just a complaint; it is not an impossi-
bility proof. By keeping an open mind and not rejecting paraconsistency out of hand, one might
ask a mild question: Under what conditions is paraconsistency possible? Various philosophical
arguments have been put forward to justify the sensibility of paraconsistency [2, 9]. They point
to apparent examples of paraconsistency in some of our reasoning. Even adopting a rigorous
approach, one can point to various paraconsistent logics (e.g., da Costa’s hierarchy Ck [1]) So
paraconsistency is, evidently, possible, at least from the perspective of abstract consequence
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relations. But perhaps these philosophical arguments for the plausibility of paraconsistent,
and semantic approaches demonstrating the possibility of paraconsistent logics, are somehow
unsatisfying. Is there another way?
One avenue for taking a fresh approach is to treat paraconsistency as a target for automated
theory exploration. More precisely, paraconsistency becomes a problem for knowledge represen-
tation, to be investigated with automated theorem provers (ATPs) and model (or countermodel)
finders . On this approach, one “externalizes” one’s assumptions about logic by stating them
explicitly in a logical language, and then uses automated reasoning systems to explore the sub-
ject by trying to prove or refute statements about paraconsistent logic that have been rigorously
formulated. (To be clear, we mean to use ATPs to reason about paraconsistency, not to reason
within a paraconsistent logic [5].)
The approach is hardly new; see, for example, the work of Ulrich [10] and Wos [11] for many
similar applications, e.g., to intuitionistic logic, classical logic, relevance logics, modal logics,
etc. To our knowledge, though, the idea of exploring the foundations of paraconsistency with
the help of automated theorem provers, in the spirit of Lakatos, is new. We believe that such an
approach can complement standard semantic methods for investigating paraconsistency, offers
a fresh argument for the possibility of paraconsistency, and can even suggest new problems in
research into paraconsistency.
After considering the impact our choice of representation may have on the interpretation
of our results (Section 2), the heart of the paper consists of a series of (machine-assisted)
experiments bearing on paraconsistency are considered. In Section 3 we consider the very
possibility of paraconsistency. We work with da Costa’s C1 [4]. One starts to glimpse what
paraconsistency has to offer by finding that the one cannot prove in C1 that, for every ϕ,
that ϕ∧ ¬ϕ is explosive. In Section 4 we consider the amusing case of trivializing triviality. In
Section 5 we take an opposite tack, focusing on the conditions for the possibility of explosiveness
(or non-paraconsistency). Finally, in Section 6 we concern ourselves with the existence of ⊥-like
explosive particles. Section 7 summarizes and considers possibility for further work along the
lines taken here.
2 Representation: first-order provability structures
Our target is a class of paraconsistent propositional logics. We focus, more specifically, on
da Costa’s C1 [4, 3]. To get started, we postulating a primitive unary predicate P, intended to
represent the set of theorems. The intended domain of discourse consists of propositions. Our
aim is to lay down axioms that capture a set of theorems.
It may seem hopeless to take such an abstract approach, but such an approach pays off. By
adopting an approach that is amendable to ATPs, we put ourselves in a position to reap their
fruit. Notwithstanding some important expressive limitations of first-order logic, ATPs have
the delightful ability to, one the one hand, confirm that what we expect to be provable is in
fact provable, but perhaps in a way which is wholly unexpected. On the other hand, an ATP
is often able to reveal genuine gaps in our own thinking. If one is new to paraconsistency, one
might even find that an ATP can assist one to see the field with an open mind.
To represent consequence relations (relations |= between subsets of a set X and X), we
work with elementary classes of first-order structures in a language with a distinguished unary
predicate P, intended to represent the property of being provable from no assumptions (that is,
the property of being a logical truth in whatever logic we are axiomatizing). The intended do-
main of discourse consists of propositions. The languages we consider include some connectives,
such as implication i and negation n. One might also consider adding disjunction o (“or”) and
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conjunction a (“and”). Using P and these connectives, one can axiomatize various logics by
postulating various formulas as theorems.
It is important to reflect on the properties that consequence relations have in virtue of the
representation we have chosen.
2.1 Uniform substitution
In the study of paraconsistency, one may need to pay close attention to a feature of most
propositional logics that is often tacitly used many times. Namely, the idea that, from the
standpoint of provability, atoms can be thought of as variables into which one can substitute
values (other formulas) while preserving provability. To take the simplest case, if an atom p
occurs in a theorem ϕ, then, for any formula ψ, the instance ϕ[p := ψ] of ϕ is also a theorem.
In our representation, we postulate modus ponens; but owing to the way that many automated
theorem provers work, we are effect postulating condensed detachment, which is a fusion of
modus ponens and unification into a single rule of inference [6]. Substitution is thus “built-in”.
See also McCune and Wos [7].
In the study of paraconsistency, for various reasons uniform substitution may need to be
abandoned, though there are also paraconsistent logics for which uniform substitution does
hold. In our representation, uniform substitution does hold.
2.2 Identity of propositions
Given an atomic formula p, the implication p→ p is, obviously, not the same thing as p. From
a logical point of view, the former is contingent whereas the second is a logical truth; from a
syntactic point of view, the former has length 1, whereas the latter has length 3 (counting all
symbols). There are, moreover, infinitely many distinct formulas: p is not the same as p → p,
which is not the same as p → p→ p, etc. Of course, some formulas turn out to be equivalent
to one another and so perhaps could be identified. But at least from a syntactic point of view,
there are, obviously, infinitely many distinct formulas.
When logics are represented in the first-order manner that we have adopted in this paper,
one soon encounters the perplexing fact that there exist finite models of our axioms. Since
the intended domain of discourse consists of formulas, and since implication and negation are
present, how can it be there are only finitely many formulas? Why, in other words, can’t we
replay the argument in the preceding paragraph to the effect that there are infinitely many
formulas?
From a first-order model of C1 (especially, finite ones), one can construct a structure which
perhaps accords more one’s intuition. What is wanted is a structure (X,⊢) whereX is an infinite
set of formulas and ⊢ is a distinguished subset of X (the theorems). X should, moreover, be
generated by formula-building functions (connectives) such as →, ¬, ∧, ∨. The difficulty is to
construct a suitable homomorphism from an arbitrary algebra of formulas into a an generated
algebra of formulas. We do not go into the details here.
2.3 Expressive limitations of FOL
Using the plain language of FOL in which we represent our problems, a few natural properties of
structures are in fact not representable. We are unable to express, for example, that the domain
of discourse (formulas) are generated by a set of atoms. Only partial remedies are avaiable. We
can define the notion of atom as not being the value of the negation, conjunction, disjunction,
or implication formula-building operations and then postulate, for instance, the existence of
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atoms. We can even define the notion of being an implication, being a negation, etc., and
postulate that everything is either (1) an atom, or (2) an implication, or (3) a conjunction,
or. . . . But such efforts still fail to capture the familiar property of propositional languages that
they are generated by their atoms, that negation is an injection into the set of formulas, etc.
We can postulate principles that ensure that the domain of discourse is infinite. For exbam-
ple, dealing with an implication and negation, we can ensure that the domain of discourse is
infinite by postulating that
• Implications are not negations;
• The negation of ϕ is never ϕ (that is, ¬ is an injection on the set of formulas);
Given an implication ϕ, these conditions ensure that ¬ϕ, ¬¬ϕ, . . . , are all distinct objects. In-
terestingly, for the purposes of proving theorems about paraconsistent logics these assumptions
are usually not needed and can be safely dropped. From the standpoint of finite model-building
this fact is evidently advantageous because it makes clear the possibility of working with finite
models.
A further consequence of the expressive weakness of first-order logic concerns the generation
of theorems (as opposed to the generation of formulas). The familiar distinction between logic
and theory in a logic is that a logic lays down the groundwork for consequence, whereas a
theory postulates additional axioms while still working within the logic. From a mathematical
point of view, a (propositional) logic consists of a set of formulas generated by a set of atoms
and some connectives, and closed under a set of inference rules. A consequence of expressive
limitations of FOL is that we generally cannot give a first-order formula that captures the fact
that the set of theorems is generated. So when examining various models, we find that there
can be “theorems from nowhere”, that is, we can be working with a theory rather than just a
logic.
2.4 The deduction theorem
The notion of provability-from-a-single-assumption is, in our case, defined in terms of the notion
of provability and implication:
ϕ |= ψ iff |= ϕ→ ψ.
Whereas for our purposes this is a definition, normally this property of provability is has
to be proved (and is known as the deduction theorem). We thereby exclude the possibility
of paraconsistent logics in which the deduction theorem does not hold. Similarly, the notion
of provability-from-two-assumptions is defined in terms of provability-from-one-assumption in
such a way as to preserve the deduction theorem:
ϕ, ψ |= χ iff ϕ |= ψ → χ.
There is apparently some non-uniqueness here, but that is addressed by the fact that C1 proves
|= ϕ→ (ψ → χ) iff |= ψ → (ϕ→ χ).
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3 Experiment 0: The very possibility of paraconsistency
Working with da Costa’s C1 [4]—that is, representing C1 in terms of the undefined predicate P
and a few sentence-building functions for implication, conjunction, disjunction, and negation—
one starts to glimpse what paraconsistency has to offer by finding that the one cannot prove
in C1 that, for every ϕ, that ϕ∧¬ϕ is explosive. Very simple models illustrating this possibility
are available.
4 Experiment 1: Trivializing triviality
Call a proposition conditionally explosive if its provability entails the provability of all propo-
sitions, that is, it its provability trivializes the logic. The definition is, in other words,
If |= ϕ, then for all ψ we have |= ψ
Are there conditionally explosive propositions? The answer is, briefly, yes. With the assis-
tance of a machine an unexpectedly clever answer (namely, Answer 4 below) to the question
can be found.
Answer 1. Is there a ⊥? If there were a distinguished formula ⊥ with a standard ⊥ → ϕ,
then of course we would be finished. It is consistent with C1 that there is a ⊥, but we have not
postulated such a formula, so we have to keep working.
Answer 2. Even without a ⊥, we can perhaps answer the question with only marginally
more work. Take a formula ϕ and consider ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ. This may not work, though, as the results
in Section 3 suggest. In many logics (e.g., intuitionistic logic, all intermediate logics, classical
logic, etc.) such a formula answers the question. It is consistent with C1 that there is such a
formula, but the results of Section 3 tell us that there’s no hope of proving the existence of such
a formula.
Answer 3. Uniform substitution does the job. Consider an atomic formulas p. If p were
provable, then by uniform substitution all formulas ϕ would be provable.
Answer 4. For any unary predicate symbol P , the following is a (somewhat awkward) theo-
rem of classical first-order logic:
∃x[P (x) → ∀yP (y)]
(To see that it is provable, consider its negation.) Now consider the consequence relation |=
of C1 and the definition of the predicate e(ϕ) (“ϕ is explosive”):
∀x[e(x)↔ (|= x→ ∀y |= y)]
The question is to prove or refute the following sentence:
∃x[|= x→ ∀y |= y]
This formula is indeed provable: it is just a recapitulation (or rather, an instance) of the
curious theorem above
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What is amusing here is that no principles of |= were used. Thus, we needn’t postulate
that C1 is closed under modus ponens, or, really, anything at all about it. The definition
of conditionally explosive formula alone does all the work. We have proved the existence of
conditionally explosive formulas from, in effect, nothing.
The result of this experiment is that we need to distinguish conditionally explosive propo-
sitions from ⊥-like formulas; see Section 6.
5 Experiment 2: The possibility of explosiveness
The logic C1 is a basis for paraconsistency, as confirmed in Section 3. But C1 is not essentially
paraconsistent in the sense that it is consistent with C1 that the explosion principle
p→ (¬p→ q)
is provable. If the explosion principle is postulated, then one can simply delete the axioms
of C1 governing the consistency operator
◦ because they all become dependent. Interestingly,
even if the explosion principle is postulated, one cannot delete the principle of excluded middle,
thereby reconfirming the idea that explosion is not inherently tied to classical logic.
6 Experiment 3: Existence of ⊥-like formulas
Call a formula ϕ ⊥-like if it has the property:
|= ϕ→ ψ for all formulas ψ
Do there exist ⊥-like formulas? One can verify easily that their existence is consistent
with C1. Further, one can postulate the existence of ⊥-like formulas and still remain paracon-
sistent.
Curiously, it is somewhat difficult to avoid ⊥-like formulas. At the time of writing, the
author has so far found no ⊥-free C1-theories have uncovered by our search methods. The
difficulty is that small finite models of C1 all have at least one bottom-like formula. It is
possible that every finite model of C1 does have a bottom-like formula and there exists an
infinite model of C1 without a bottom-like particle.
7 Conclusion and future work
We have considered the concept of paraconsistency from the perspective of a machine, trying
to externalize our assumptions about logic and investigating paraconsistency systematically
with the help of automated reasoning technology. We have motivated the basic distinctions in
paraconsistency, and even offered a fresh argument for its possibility, by pursuing this route.
Like da Costa, the consistency operator ◦ is in our approach a defined operation on formulas.
It could, however, be considered as primitive. Apropos Section 3, one could even consider the
possibility of other definitions of ◦ that accomplish precisely what it does. In the context of
so-called lightly explosive logics, one might consider the following principle (which one might
call “imminent explosions”):
For all ϕ, there exists a ψ such that for all χ, we have {ϕ,¬ϕ, ψ} |= χ
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which is an abstract variation of the notion of finite gentle explosion [3].
Apropos Section 5, it would be worth investigating whether intuitionistic logic is obtained
by postulating explosion but removing the principle of excluded middle. In Section 6 we were
unable to settle the question of whether ⊥-like particles always exist. Presumably, they do not
always exist (working, that is, in C1), but so far our methods have not been able to resolve this
one way or another.
In the end, one might take the view that paraconsistency is simply impossible or incoherent.
The most to which one accedes is that paraconsistent logics are certain sets of formulas (in the
present work, C1-based theories), axiomatized in certain ways; one does not take the further
step that these sets of formulas have any bearing on acceptable reasoning, say, for mathematics
or science. The work presented here cannot refute this view. Nonetheless, we hope to have
provided another weapon in the conceptual arsenal for the paraconsistent researcher and opened
a new method for investigating the foundations of paraconsistency.
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